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or our relations with the Soviet bloc, the nuclear age demands above all a clarification of doctrine.

At a moment when technology has put within our grasp a command of nature never before imagined, we are driven to realize that everything depends on our ability to use power with subtlety and discrimination.

In the absence of concepts that define the nature of power, its purpose, and its relation to policy, the possession of it may serve merely to paralyze the will. All the difficult choices of the nuclear period, the nature of its weapons systems, the risks diplomacy can run, the issues for which to contend, presuppose a doctrinal answer before they can find a technical one.

This is particularly true of military strategy. Because we have won two world wars by outproducing our opponent, we have tended to equate military superiority with superiority in resources and technology. Yet history demonstrates that superiority in strategic doctrine has, at least as often, been the cause of victory as has superiority in resources.

Superior doctrine enabled the Germans in 1940 to defeat an allied army superior in numbers and, at least, equal in equipment but wedded to an outmoded concept of warfare. Superior mobility and the use of artillery, a better relationship between fire and movement, furnished the basis of Napoleon's victories. Similar examples were the victories of the Roman legions over the Macedonian phalanx, of the English archers against the medieval knights. All these were victories not of resources but of strategic doctrine. The ability to break the framework which had come to be taken for granted and to present the antagonist with a new concept, which he had never even considered.

Strategic doctrine translates policy into policy. Whether the goal of a state is offensive or defensive, whether it seeks to achieve or prevent a change, its strategy doctrine must be able to determine what actions are worth contending for and to select the appropriate force for achieving them.

By establishing a pattern of response to advance of crisis situations, strategy doctrine permits a power to act purposefully in the face of challenges. It is a concept which will constantly be surprised by events. An adequate strategic doctrine is therefore the basic requirement of American security.

It may be argued, of course, that we possess a strategic doctrine expressed in the decisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the National Security Council. On the basis of which the force levels of our armed forces are determined by Congress. The decisions of the Joint Chiefs and of the National Security Council give a unified impression of unity of purpose.

The officials comprising these bodies are service chiefs in the case of the Joint Chiefs and heads of executive departments in the case of the National Security Council. As administrators of separate organizations, they must give their attention to reducing the friction of the administrative machine both within their department and in the relation of their department to other agencies.

The heads of departments do not fight the battle of the Atlantic. They are concerned for it. In fact, the department view is sometimes purposely exaggerated in order to facilitate compromise.

As a result, the conclusions of both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council reflect more the attainable compromise among sovereign departments than a unified direction.

Such an agreement is frequently unattainable except by framing conclusions in very general language, decisions by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the National Security Council end interdepartmental agreement. Instead they shift them to an abstract level of meaning of directives.

THE MILITARY BUDGET WASTE AND THE LACK OF AN ADEQUATE STRATEGIC DOCTRINE

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, in a short time the Congress will be asked to approve force levels in the military services, along with the money necessary to implement them, as recommended by the executive branch of the Government. To this end, if one includes foreign military aid, atomic developments and strategic stockpiling, more than \$43 billion of new obligational authority and more than \$43 billion in expenditures, are being requested of the Congress.

The theory of Field Marshal Montgomery that the free world will go broke unless it starts building its defenses on the basis of progress, instead of tradition, was never more clearly illustrated than by these new budget requests; because in them are requests for vast sums of money which involve unnecessary duplication, and even triplication, always at the taxpayers' expense. In fact, Mr. President, we are now being requested to approve sums, substantial portions of which are predetermined as waste.

The primary reason for this sad condition is the continuing failure on the part of the executive branch to decide how best to defend this country in case it is ever attacked.

As a brilliant article said recently:

An adequate strategic doctrine is therefore the basic requirement of American security.

More and more of our people are beginning to realize the basic fact that we have no such strategic doctrine.

In this connection, Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a part of a recent, brilliant article entitled "Strategy and Organization," written by Mr. Henry Kissinger, and published in Foreign Affairs for April 1957, be inserted at this point in the body of the Record. Never has the problem some of us have been presenting for years been so well and clearly presented.

There being no objection, the excerpt from the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

—Graham and Greenham
 (By Henry A. Kissinger)

Whatever the problem, whether it concerns our military strategy, our system of alliances,

or services whose disagreements prevent the development of doctrine in the first place will choose the excesses close to their original point of view.

It is the seeming unanimity of our policy-making bodies only defers the doctrinal crisis until some crisis or the budgetary process forces reconsideration under the pressure of events.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I would like to insert in the National parts of this article, the part of this year's decision by the Senate with respect to the military budget. Everyone will realize just how, and to what degree, we shall waste.

I now believe that those who are stating the policies of this country are, in effect, taxing us out of our defense system.

It may not be true; but I think all agree that the high cost of the Military Establishment, in the face of the growing strength of communism, demands maximum defense for the least amount of money spent.

At the standpoint of a sound economy, as well as from the point of view of the Nation's security, it is necessary for America to formulate strategic doctrine."

More than 4 million citizens of the United States are now in the military establishment, and inasmuch as the United States is being paid by the American taxpayer through the Pentagon, I think every Member of Congress who votes on the new defense budget should read the article by Mr. Kissinger.

Mr. President, I turn now to another

Mr. SYMINGTON. The Senator will be on the floor.